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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of gender on the individual prob-
ability of leaving unemployment. I compare the job search behaviour of single women 
with that of single or married men. I estimate a reduced form model of the probability of 
leaving unemployment. The destination states out of unemployment are modelled using a 
competing risks specification. I conclude that the gender of the unemployed persons does 
not affect significantly the individual probability of leaving unemployment. I do, instead, 
find that marital status has a significant impact on the re-employment probability. 
1. Intro duet ion 
Previous appl ied s tudies of t h e individual probabi l i ty of leaving unemploy-
men t have often found t h a t female unemployed 's tand lower chances of exi t ing 
from unemploymen t to t ake up a ful l- t ime jbb , once individual heterogenei ty 
arising from o ther sources has been cont'rolled for. T h | s issue is in teres t ing 
for economie policy purposes . Is it for ins tance t h e case t h a t unemployed 
persons are d iscr iminated by po ten t ia l employers because of thei r gender? 
1I owe many thanks for useful comments to John Mickleright, Siv Gustafsson, Lavan 
Mahadeva and the participants of seminars given at the women studies groups of the 
European University Institute and the University of Amsterdam. Patrick Heady of the 
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys is to be thanked for having made the data 
available. Göetz Rohwer provided me with a program to analyse the data. 
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Not much evidence on this issue is available for the UK. Most previous UK 
studies of unemployment duration have restricted attention to male unem-
ployed on the implicit assumption that the job search behaviour of women is 
signincantly different from that of men. This assumption has, however, not 
been tested before, at least to my knowledge. 
The UK literature has instead looked at the impact of social security 
benefits on the labour force participation of lone mothers (Blundell, Duncan 
and Meghir, 1992, Jenkins, 1992). Social security provisions for lone mothers 
are found to have a disincentive effect on the labour force participation of 
lone mothers. Other studies have investigated the disincentive effect tha t the 
payment of unemployment benefit might have on the labour force participa-
tion of women married to unemployed men (Garcia, 1989, Micklewright and 
Giannelli, 1992). Some authors have looked at the labour force participation 
of "mothers". For example, Perry (1990) investigates the return to work of 
women after the birth of their first child. 
The aim of the present study is to compare the probability of leaving 
unemployment of single women with that of single or married men. I use for 
this purpose a sample drawn from the "Survey of Living Standards during 
Unemployment" (LSUS). The LSUS contains information only on the single 
women unemployed. The strategy adopted by the survey planners with re-
spect to the definition of the survey sample was such that married women 
unemployed were excluded from the sample. However, given the social secu-
rity rules in force at the time the survey was carried out, not many married 
women were likely to claim successfully unemployment benefit. Therefore, 
many unemployed married women would have been excluded anyway from 
surveys which drew their sample from unemployment benefit registers, such 
as the present one. 
The main drawback of the analysis carried out in this paper is the small 
sample size of the single people group in the LSUS data. 
The structure of the paper is the following. The data are described in the 
Section 2. The econometrie model is illustrated in Section 3. The probability 
of leaving unemployment is modelled as a conditional probability using the 
hazard rate. The probability of leaving unemployment to take up a job is 
distinguished from the probability of exiting from unemployment to enter 
other non-work states by means of a competing risks specification. The 
model is estimated both non-parametrically and parametrically. The results 
2 
model is estimated both non-parametrically and parametrically. The results 
of estimation are discussed in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
2. A description of the da ta 
The data I use are the survey of "Living Standards during Unemployment" 
(LSUS), which was conducted by the Office of Population Censuses and Sur-
veys on behalf of DHS, in 1983-1984. These data are a longitudinal sample 
of the inflow into unemployment. 
One advantage of the LSUS survey over other available datasets is tha t it 
relates to a time when the level of unemployment was closed to the current 
levels. In 1983-84, the unemployment rate in the UK was high and rising, 
averaging out about 12-13%. Most previous UK studies on unemployment 
duration relate, instead, to the late seventies, when the unemployment rate 
was much lower and equal to about 5%. A further adavantage of the LSUS 
survey is tha t it contains detailed information on many individual character-
istics. Furthermore these data are largely unexploited for econometrie and 
economie policy analysis nothwithstanding the fact that they were released 
in 1989. 
The LSUS is a two stage stratified random sample of the inflow into 
registered unemployment. The sample is drawn from the population of un-
employed that started to register at Great Britain unemployment benefit 
offices in the summer of 1983. The unemployed with the following character-
istics were sampled: married men living with their spouses and children or 
single people of either gender living on their own or just with their children; 
persons aged between 20 and 58; persons unemployed for at least about 12 
weeks following the start of their sampled unemployment spell. The last 
characteristic results in left truncation of the sample. 
The definition of household heads (first criterion listed above) led to fe-
male unemployed being sampled only if they were single people and lived 
on their own (or at most with their children). As a consequence, a small 
number of women were included in the sample. Less than 10% of the survey 
participants are women. Also residents in institutions and single people that 
shared accomodation with others were excluded from the survey sample as 
a consequence of the definition of "household head" adopted. 
The unemployed sampled were then interviewed twice: the first time 
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about three months after the date of registration at benefit offices; the sec-
ond time about a year later, i. e. about 15 months after the start of their 
unemployment spells, approximately in the Autumn of 1984. According to 
Heady and Smith (1989) the reponse rate to the first interview, taking into 
account non-response to a sift questionnaire that was carried out before the 
first interview took place, was about 70%. The response rate to the second 
interview was 79%. Non-participants to the second interview are not consid-
ered here since the information on the duration of the unemployment spell 
is only available for second interview participants2 . Also, some unemployed 
that turned out to be already unemployed in the week before they had reg-
istered at benefit offices3 were deleted from the sample. The final sample 
selected for econometrie analysis is made up of 2198 unemployed, of whom 
167 are single women, 270 are single men and 1765 are married men. 
The number of children of the single people in the sample is shown in in 
Table 0.1. As one would generally expect, the proportion of lone mothers is 
much higher than that of lone fathers. However, few of the single women in 
the sample considered have children, i. e. they are "lone mothers". 
Table 0.1: Single people and lone parents 
children num- single man single woman total 
ber 
0 249 116 365 
1 12 34 46 
2 7 10 17 
3 2 3 5 
total 270 163 433 
Social security is very important here not only for the alledged negative 
effect on the re-employment probability but also for the role played in the 
2Participants in the first interview only could be treated as having right-censored spells 
at the time of the first interview (about three months into the unemployment spell). 
However, they should also be treated as having left-truncated spells at the time of the 
first interview. As a consequence their contribution to the likelihood function for the data 
would equal 1 and be irrelevant. 
3This inconsistency in the starting date of the sampled unemployment spells resulted 
from the information on the economie activity in the week before the start of the sampled 
unemployment spell, collected retrospectively at the time of the first interview. 
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definition of unemployment and consequently for the sample coverage of fe-
male unemployed. There are two main types of benefits for the unemployed, 
in the UK: the national insurance Unemployment Benefit (UB), entitlement 
to which is conditional on the payment of sufficiënt work contributions and 
various other conditions; the social assistance benefit, Supplementary Benefit 
(SB)4, which is means-tested and subject to showing availability for work. 
The payment of UB is limited in time while the payment of SB is unlimited 
in time. Some unemployed may receive both benefits simultaneously, for 
instance if their resources including UB fall below their needs. 
Up to 1983, married female unemployed were not allowed to claim Sup-
plementary Benefit. To say it with Ogus and Barendt (1982, pag. 8) words: 
The model which traditionally dominated social policy think-
ing was that of the wife doing the housework and rearing the 
children while the husband was the breadwinner. Thus entitle-
ment to the means-tested benefit, which aggregated the resources 
and needs of the family or household, was in general restricted to 
the husband or male partner5 . 
Following an EEC equal opportunity directive of 1979, the U. K. social secu-
rity law was changed and since 1984 either partner is allowed to claim social 
assistance benefit. However, the traditional model still dominates. As far 
as the national insurance contributory unemployment benefit (UB) is con-
cerned, married female workers were given until the eighties the choice of 
opting out of the national insurance system by not paying any contributions. 
Also this anomaly was removed since 1984. 
Some descriptive statistics of the type of unemployment received by the 
sample respondents are given in Table 0.2. The benefits received by the stock 
of the unemployed in Great Britain in 1983 are also shown for comparison 
purposes. The source for these figures are the yearly published social security 
statistics of the UK Department of Social Security (DSS). The survey samples 
only single women. The DSS figures cover instead also married women. 
However, as discussed above married women were not entitled to SB (in 1983) 
and they also had the option of opting out of the UB contribution system. 
The last row of the first column of Table 0.2 relates to the unemployed that 
4Since the 1988 reform of social security, this benefit is called Income Support. 
5Ogus and Barendt, 1982, pag. 8. 
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Table 0.2: Whicfa benefits for which respondents? 
The ben-
efits 
received 
particip 
men 
2nd int. 
women 
unemployed stock at 1983 
men women 
UB only 
UB and 
SB 
SB only 
no UB SB 
36.2% 
28.5% 
30.7% 
4.7% 
30.6% 
9.4% 
53.1% 
6.9% 
21% 
10.7% 
58.2% 
10.2% 
35.2 % 
3.7% 
43.2% 
17.9% 
Total no. 2035( 100%) 163 (100%) 2163000 (100%) 817000 (100%) 
do not receive any benefit. In the LSUS survey, this figure relates mainly 
to claimants of unemployment benefit that are temporarily suspended from 
benefit receipt. In the Social Security statistics, this figure includes also those 
unemployed that made a claim to receive benefit but were denied entitlement 
to benefit receipt. 
From Table 0.2, it emerges that the proportion of unemployed men receiv-
ing UB is higher in the survey sample than in the stock of the unemployed. 
This result is explained by the fact that the stock of the unemployed is more 
likely to cover longer spells of unemployment than the survey sample (which 
is an inflow sample). Indeed, UB lasts in principle6 only for a year. The 
proportion of unemployed women receiving UB, either on its own or together 
with SB, is slightly higher in the survey sample (40%) than in the stock of 
the unemployed (38.9%). The proportion of unemployed men receiving SB 
is higher among the stock of the unemployed than in the survey sample. 
This is explained by the same argument as above. Instead, the proportion 
of women receiving SB is larger in the LSUS sample than in the stock of the 
unemployed. However, if those unemployed women that are refused entitle-
ment to benefit (about 18% of the stock of unemployed women) are excluded 
from the stock of the unemployed, the proportion of women that receive SB 
becomes about 52% of the unemployed stock, which is closer to the figure in 
the survey sample. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometrie analysis 
6Once entitlement to UB exhausts, after a year of unemployment, it is necessary to 
work continuously for a period of 13 weeks in order to gain new entitlement to UB. 
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are given in Tab Ie 0.3. Three groups of the unemployed are considered with 
respect to gender and marital status: single women, single men and mar-
ried men. The folio wing explanatory variables have been considered: family 
composition variables; previous work history; expected earnings from work; 
amounts and types of unemployment benefit received; some proxy of search 
intensity; an indicator of the value attributed to leisure as relative to work; 
a dummy for whether the unemployed person feit nnancially contrained; the 
unemployment rate in the geographical area of residence (county)7. 
Table 0.3: Descriptive statistics of the economie variables 
Single women Single men Married men 
Variatie Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Left truncation period 
Right-censored observations 
Unemployment duration (weeks) 
Ever had a full-time job 
Professional/'Intermediate Occupation 
Unskilled Occupation 
Age 
Has any child aged less than 5 
Bas any child aged between 5 and 11 
Married 
Spouse working 1 month before U. 
Searches less than before 
Values Leisure more than Labour 
Experience some shortage of money 
House owner outright/with mortgage 
County unemployment rate, at Oct. 83 
Receives only UB at first interview 
UB/SB amount in £, logs 
Expected earnings, in £, logs. 
Expexted earnings not available 
Maintenance payments, in £, logs. 
13.3374 
0.5153 
45.3313 
0.8221 
0.2025 
0.0307 
40.5890 
0.0123 
0.0307 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2025 
0.2086 
0.3436 
0.2822 
13.3086 
0.3067 
3.0115 
4.0985 
0.0061 
0.2512 
1.1505 
0.5013 
18.3892 
0.3836 
0.4031 
0.1730 
11.9973 
0.1104 
0.1730 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.4031 
0.4076 
0.4764 
0.4515 
3.1764 
0.4626 
0.8719 
0.3847 
0.0783 
0.7645 
13.4407 
0.5444 
44.0852 
0.8963 
0.1741 
0.0889 
37.2222 
0.0037 
0.0111 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1333 
0.1296 
0.4222 
0.2667 
13.3659 
0.3111 
3.2390 
4.3817 
0.0111 
0.0000 
I.0745 
0.4989 
18.0243 
0.3054 
0.3799 
0.2851 
11.6022 
0.0609 
0.1050 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.3406 
0.3365 
0.4948 
0.4430 
3.2409 
0.4638 
0.5575 
0.5220 
0.1050 
0.0000 
13.4017 
0.6023 
42.7841 
0.9547 
0.1728 
0.0533 
37.9286 
0.3926 
0.2584 
1.0000 
0.3099 
0.0901 
0.1382 
0.3983 
O.4142 
13.6192 
0.3694 
3.5143 
4.4585 
0.0113 
0.0000 
1.0547 
0.4896 
17.4250 
0.2081 
0.3782 
0.2246 
11.1634 
0.4885 
0.4379 
0.0000 
0.4626 
0.2864 
0.3453 
0.4897 
0.4927 
3.1990 
0.4828 
0.9083 
0.5161 
0.1059 
0.0000 
The single women are 163, the single men are 270, the married men are 1765. The dummy 
variables take value one if the condition stated for each of them is satisfied. The mean duration is 
taken over all observations (including the right-censored observations). The logarithms are taken 
over the non-zero observations. U. stands for the sampled unemployment spell. 
7The county was the most disaggregated geographical unit available. This variable is 
not allowed to vary over time since the relative positions of different counties with regards 
to their level of unemployment did not change substantially in the period of time covered 
by the survey. 
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The expected earnings from work were constructed using the fitted earn-
ings from earnings equations8 to avoid potential endogeneity of the last job 
earnings (Narendranathan and Nickell, 1985). The level of unemployment 
benefit is a time varying variable (see Stancanelli, 1993). It is allowed to 
vary for recipients of the national insurance benefit (UB) at the time of ex-
haustion of entitlement to UB. 
I have constructed a dummy that takes value one if the unemployed re-
ported to "suffer from money shortage" at the time of the first interview. 
Access to credit or perhaps also wealth is proxied by a dummy for house 
ownership. This variable might however capture also other unobserved in-
dividual characteristics such as the capacity to plan forward or stability. 
Individual leisure valuation is proxied by a dummy constructed using replies 
to the following question, asked at the time of the first interview: uIf you 
were to get enough money to live as comfortably as you would like for the 
rest of your life, would you want to have a job or would you prefer not to 
workf\ Diminished search intensity is measured by a dummy contructed 
on the basis of the replies given to the following question at the time of the 
first interview: uHere is a list of things people do. We would like to know 
whether you do each thing more or less than you did four or five months 
ago, bef ore you started/restarted signing on at an unemployment benefit of-
fice ••• Visiting an unemployment benefit office or a job centre". There is 
evidence that search through job centres or other employment agencies is.one 
of the most widely used method of job search by the unemployed in the UK 
(Layard et al. , 1991, Wadsworth, 1991). These indicators of the individual 
valuation of leisure and (diminished) search intensity are not allowed to vary 
during the course of the unemployment spell. They are measured at the start 
(or sometime before the start) of the unemployment spell to avoid potential 
endogeneity problems. 
From inspection of Table 0.3, it emerges that married men have on average 
shorter unemployment durations than single people of either gender. Married 
men are on average more likely to hold professional qualifications (which 
correspond normally to a University degree) than single people of either 
gender. Married men are also more likely to own the house were they live and 
8The procedure adopted was slightly more complicated and it involved imputing ex-
pected earnings for the unemployed for whom the last earnings information was not avail-
able (see Stancanelli, 1993). 
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Table 0.4: Dest inat ion s tates out of unemployment 
destination 
state 
single woman single man married man 
right-censored 
fuU-time work 
part-time 
work 
other states 
total 
79 
35 
19 
30 
163 
125 
98 
11 
36 
270 
710 
835 
57 
163 
1765 
The destination states are defined as the economie states 
entered upon leaving unemployment. The unemployed 
that have not exited unemployment by the the end of the 
observation period are classified as right-censored. The 
destination other states includes any other state than 
work, such as: government training scheme, full-time ed-
ucation, sickness, in care of family. 
to have children, which seems quite reasonable. Instead, single women are 
on average older than single or married men. Single women's unemployment 
benefit receipts and expected earnings are lower on average than those of 
men. However, single women are found to have a higher valuation of leisure 
as relative to labour than men (either single or married). 
In Table 0.4, I show the destination states out of unemployment of the 
three groups of the unemployed. I consider, full-time work, part-time work 
and "other states". The destination "other states" includes any non-work 
state such as full-time education, governement training scheme, household 
work, sickness, withdrawal from the labour force and retirement. These dif-
ferent destination states are aggregated together given the small number of 
observations exiting to each of them. For similar reason, given the small 
number of observation exiting into part-time work, in the econometrie anal-
ysis part-time work will be treated in turns together with full-time work or 
with "other states". 
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3. The econometrie model 
The individual probability of leaving unemployment is modelled as a con-
ditional probability, using the hazard rate. Let us define the duration of 
the unemployment spell, T, as a random variable, with density function 
f(t) and distribution function F(t). The survivor function is defined as 
G(t) = 1 — F(t). The hazard rate is given by the instantaneous conditional 
probability of leaving unemployment, which is is defined as: 
This expression describes the probability of leaving unemployment in any 
instant of time, t, conditional on being still unemployed an infinitesimal 
amount of time to the left of t. 
It is possible to express the survivor function in terms of the hazard rate, 
as follows: 
G(t) = exp{- fd{u)du}, (0.2) 
Jo 
and also the density function in terms of the hazard rate: 
ƒ(<) = 6(t)exp{- [ 6(u)du}. (0.3) 
./o 
The hazard rate is normally allowed to depend on the elapsing of the time 
spent in the state of unemployment, t, and on a vector x(t) of socio-economic 
individual characteristics and labour market conditions. The dependency on 
time of the hazard rate is captured by the so-called baseline hazard. I specify 
an exponential piecewise linear functional form for the hazard rate, as follows: 
9{t) = exp(am)exp(0Xi(t)), (0.4) 
where m segments of the baseline hazard rate are defined. The baseline 
hazard rate is allowed to vary across the m intervals of time but it is assumed 
to remain constant within each time interval m. The advantage of adopting 
a piecewise linear specification of the hazard rate is that the sign of the 
dependency on time of the hazard rate is allowed to vary over time. 
Multiple destinations out of unemployment are modelled by means of a 
competing risks model. Competing risks specifications model unemployment 
duration together with the states exited into upon leaving unemployment. 
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Instead, in a single risk framework exit from unemployment is defined as exit 
to any destination state. In a competing risks framework, the probability 
of leaving unemployment at a certain point in time, t, and of exiting to a 
specific destination state fc, given the set D of different possible exit states, 
can written as: 
a u\ r P{t<T<t + dt,D = k,\T>t) 
6k(t) = hm , (0.5) 
which is the so-called cause-specific hazard. If the different destinations k 
are assumed to be mutually exclusive, as plausible, the overall hazard rate 
can be rewritten as the sum of the cause-specific hazard rates: 
0(ii,Zi(*)) = ;C0k(*»ai(*))> (0.6) 
keD 
where D is the set of destination states considered. I shall distinguish exit 
into a job (or alternatively exit into full-time work only) from exit into other 
states. The piecewise linear competing risks specification of the hazard rate 
is the following: 
6{th Xi{t)) = E e ^ { « m + ^ ( 0 > (0-7) 
keD 
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The contribution of each 
completed spell of unemployment to the sample likelihood is the density 
function, the contribution of right-censored spells is the survivor function 
evaluated at the time of right-censoring. The log-likelihood function for the 
sample is the following, where " i s " is the left truncation time: 
l = £ { ( G m ) W ) } + E i " hexpMPx-^du], (0.8) 
k A i "/*. 
The following expression for the competing risks log-likelihood is ob-
tained: 
i = E Ei«m + Pkxf(t)} + E E ( - T«p{*4 + ^(«)du> (o.9) 
ktDieA k keD i i s 
Unobserved heterogeneity is not allowed for. It would seem to be the 
case that unobserved heterogeneity is more of a problem when the functional 
form adopted for the baseline hazard is rather restrictive such as for instance 
the monotonie Weibull than if a flexible baseline is allowed for. Allowing 
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for unobserved heterogeneity requires one to make assumptions on its possi-
ble correlation across the two cause-specific hazards which are often rather 
unrealistic9. Moreover, for the purpose of the present analysis one should 
also allow unobserved heterogenity to differ across the three groups of the 
unemployed considered: single women, single men, married men. One should 
then make further assumptions about the possible correlation of the errors 
across the exit states out of unemployment and the three groups of the un-
employed defined. There is no reason to believe that the distortions possibly 
introduced by these additional assumptions will be less severe than those 
possibly arising from uncontrolled unobserved heterogeneity. The main find-
ing of previous authors that have allowed for unobserved heterogeneity in a 
competing risks framework and that have specified a flexible baseline haz-
ard rate is that allowing for unobserved heterogeneity tends to increase the 
absolute value of the estimated coefficients (Katz and Meyer, 1988). 
4. Results of estimation 
Kaplan-Meier survivor functions 
The survivor function for the three groups —single women, single men, mar-
ried men- and for different destinations out of unemployment was first esti-
mated by non-parametric Kaplan-Meier method. This method relies on the 
information contained in the observed frequency of the exits out of unemploy-
ment (see for example Kalbfleish and Prentice, 1980, for a description of this 
method). Non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor functions 
are obtained assuming individual homogeneity. 
The estimated competing risks survivor functions for single women are 
plotted in Figure 0.1. The exit states out of unemployment considered are 
full-time work and other states. Exit into a part-time job is considered 
together with other states. The graph start at week 12 since the behaviour of 
the hazard rate before then is not known because of the left truncation of the 
sample. The two curves follow more or less the same pattern over time except 
from week 41 onwards. From week 41 onwards the survivor function for exit 
into other states lies below that for exit into full-time work. This implies 
that the probability of leaving unemployment to enter states other than full-
9Normally either zero or perfect correlation is assumed. 
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Figure 0.1: 
time work is larger than the probability of passing from unemployment into 
full-time work from week 41 onwards. It is perhaps surprising that before the 
40th week of unemployment the two probabilities do not differ much from 
each other. 
The corresponding competing risks survivor functions for single men are 
plotted in Figure 0.2. The behaviour of the two survivor functions is quite 
different from that of the corresponding curves for the single female unem-
ployed. The survivor function for exit into full-time work lies below that 
for exit into other states from the beginning of the observation period. This 
indicates that the probability of leaving unemployment to take up a full-time 
job is higher at any point in time than the probability of exiting to other 
states for single men. Similar behaviour is foliowed by the two competing 
risks survivor functions for married men (which are not shown here). 
The null hypothesis that the estimated competing risks survivor functions 
for men and women do not differ significantly from each other was tested 
using a Log-Rank test (see Kalbfleish and Prentice, 1980, for a description 
of this test), which is based on the estimated Standard errors of the survivor 
functions. The test statistic is distributed as a "x^'N where the number of 
degrees of freedom of the test, k, is equal to the number of groups compared. 
The null hypothesis that the probabilities of leaving unemployment to take 
up a full-time job (the survivor functions for exit into full-time work) of 
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Figure 0.2: 
the single women unemployed and the single men unemployed do not differ 
significantly cannot be rejected on the basis of a Log-Ratio test (xl = 8-5). 
The null hypothesis that the two survivor functions for exit into states other 
than full-time work do not differ significantly across the two groups cannot 
be rejected either on the basis of a Log-Ratio test (xl = 6-1)- The Log-Rank 
test was also carried out considering a different set of destination states: 
part-time work was included together with full-time work and, consequently, 
excluded from the "other states" destination. The null hypothesis that the 
survivor functions of the two groups did not differ significantly could not be 
rejected {x\ = 2.1, for exit into full-time or part-time job, and x\ — 1-2 for 
exit into other states). 
The same hypotheses were then tested with respect to the two groups 
of married men unemployed and single women unemployed. In this case, 
the null hypothesis that the survivor functions for exit into full-time work of 
single women and married men did not differ significantly could be rejected on 
the basis of a Log-Ratio test (xl = 27.3). Similarly, the null hypothesis that 
the two survivor function for exit into other states did not differ significantly 
could be rejected ( x | = 26.3). If part-time work were considered together 
with full-time work, the survivor functions for exit into a job resulted to be 
significantly different on the basis of a Log-Ratio test (x\ ~ 13.2). However, 
the null hypothesis that the survivor functions for the two groups of the 
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Figure 0.3: 
unemployed and for exit into states other than a job did not differ significantly 
could not be strongly rejected (the Log Ratio test is x\ = 9-0). 
The survivor function for exit from unemployment into any destination 
state (single risk model) is plotted for the single peopie of either gender in 
Figure 0.3. These are 163 female unemployed and 270 male unemployed. 
The two survivor functions foUow a similar behaviour over time. However, 
the survivor function for the single men unemployed Hes above that for sin-
gle women unemployed at any point in time. A Log-Rank test of the null 
hypothesis that the survivor functions for the two gender groups are not 
significantly different from each other —i. e. that the probability of leaving 
unemployment does not differ significantly for the two gender groups— can 
not reject the null hypothesis. 
The survivor functions for the single women and the married men and for 
exit into any destination (single risk case) are plotted in Figure 0.4. The two 
curves follow the same behaviour over time. The survivor function for the 
female unemployed lies above that for the married male unemployed at any 
point in time. This indicates that female unemployed stand lower chances 
than male unemployed to leave unemployment at any point in time. However, 
the significance of this apparent difFerence between the two survivor functions 
is rejected on the basis of a Log-Rank test. 
On the basis of this non-parametric evidence, it is then possible to con-
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clude that the probability of leaving unemployment to exit to any destination 
state (single risk model) does not differ significantly across single women and 
single or married men. However, I find in a non-parametric competing risks 
framework of analysis that the probability of leaving unemployment to take 
up a job (either full-time or part-time) differ significantly between single 
women and married men. 
R e s u l t s of e s t i m a t i o n of t h e p iecewise l inear m o d e l 
The econometrie model specified in Section 3 has been estimated separately 
for single women, single men and married men. The null hypothesis that 
the job search behaviour of single women does not differ significantly from 
that of, respectively, single and married men has been tested by means of 
likelihood ratio tests. The baseline hazard rate has been allowed to vary 
every six weeks. The results of estimation are reported below, in Table 0.5. 
In the model estimated only for single women, most of the explanatory 
variables considered are found not to affect significantly the probability of 
leaving unemployment. This is perhaps due to the small number of women 
in the sample. The null hypothesis that the job search behaviour of single 
women does not differ from that of single men cannot be rejected on the basis 
of a likelihood ratio test {LR = 2*( -1123 .0- ( -413 .6 -701 .7) ) = 15.4 ~
 x\i)-
The null hypothesis that the job search behaviour of single women does not 
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differ from that of married men cannot be rejected either on the basis of a 
likelihood ratio test (LR = 2 * (-5449.3 - (-413.6 - 5026.2)) = 19.0 ~ xli)-
The model was then estimated for the Ml sample pooling together the 
triree groups of single women and married or single men. The impact of 
gender was modelled using a dummy, which took value one if the unemployed 
person was a single woman. To allow for the impact of marital status (of 
men) on the probability of leaving unemployment an additional interaction 
variable was constructed which took value one if the unemployed person was 
of male gender and married. The base for this dummy is given by the single 
people of either gender. 
Table 0.5: Results of estimation of the probability of leaving unemployment 
Variable Single women Sing e men Married men 
label CoefJ SE CoefJ SE CoefJ SE 
Baseline, wtekll-22 0.9754 3.0938 0.7944 2.1363 -2.746 0* 0.8737 
Baseline, week22-34 0.7474 3.0987 0.6521 2.1400 -2.6904* 0.8740 
Baseline, weekSS-4S 1.3907 3.1064 1.0408 2.1401 -2.2610* 0.8740 
Baseline, week47-58 0.2053 3.1300 0.3313 2.1587 -2.4046* 0.8749 
Baseline, week59-65 0.6517 3.1379 1.0440 2.1635 -2.6748* 0.8839 
Ever had a full-time job -0.0627 0.3417 -0.4039 0.2610 0.2899 0.1691 
Professional/'Intermediate Occupation 0.4-608 0.3777 0.1070 0.2825 0.2167* 0.0908 
Unskilled Occwpation -0.1511 0.7702 -0.1518 0.3558 -0.3931* 0.1633 
Logarithm of Ag e -0.5891 0.4266 -1.3462* 0.3253 -0.9839* 0.1363 
Has any child aged < 5 0.3686 1.0748 -15.0517 1868.7930 -0.2320* 0.0780 
Has any child aged between 5 and 11 0.5298 0.5486 1.3018* 0.6632 -0.0199 0.0746 
Searches less than bef ore U. -0.1322 0.3119 -0.7904* 0.3472 -0.5391* 0.1341 
Values Leisure more than Labour -0.1609 0.3239 -0.2477 0.3079 -O.I548 0.0989 
Experience money shortage 0.1202 0.2489 0.0294 0.1752 0.0638 0.0643 
House ovjner 0.0035 0.2965 0.4677* 0.2139 0.3365* 0.0675 
County unemployment rate -0.0483 0.0386 -0.0381 0.0286 -0.0194* 0.0098 
Receives only UB at lst interview 0.7249* 0.2673 0.4484* 0.2022 0.7097* 0.0737 
Amount of UB/SB received £logs. -0.2339 0.1272 -0.2549 0.1685 -0.1409* 0.0328 
Expected earnings £logs. -0.4463 0.7254 0.3305 0.4864 0.5372* 0.1940 
Expected earnings not available 1.0358 3.1635 2.0957 2.2914 2.4190* 0.9191 
U. stands for the observed unemploym ent spell. Single women max. og-lik. -4ISA ; single m en max. 
log-lik. -701.7 ; married men maar. log-t ik. -5026.2 . Descriptive statistic s of the explo natory vari ables are 
provided in Table 0.3 in the data sectio n. A * ind icates statistical signi ficance at the two-sided 5% level. 
The estimated baseline coefficients are not shown. Maximum log-likelih ood for the se ime model t stimated 
for single women and single men poolec together, with the same explani itory variable s as above, -1123.0. 
Maximum log-likelihood for the same m adel estima ted for single women and married men pooled together, 
with the same explanatory variables as t ibove, -54A 9.3. 
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This model was estimated under two different competing risks specifi-
cation. In the first model (1), full-time exit is distinguished from exit into 
any other state. In the second specification, model (2), exit into full-time 
or part-time work is distinguished from exit into any other non-work state. 
Results of estimation are shown in Table 0.6. 
Table 0.6: Results of estimation of the probability of leaving unemployment 
Variable Competing risks (1) Competing risks (2) 
label Full-tim e exit Other exits Full-time, part-time Other exits 
CoefJ SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Baseline, weekll-16 -3.1679* 0.8717 -1.0602 1.5234 -2.3618* 0.8308 -3.2621 1.8325 
Baseline, weekl7-22 -3.2738* 0.8701 -2.0570 1.5281 -2.5396* 0.8296 -4.3279* 1.8397 
Baseline, week23-28 -3.3001* 0.8711 -1.5925 1.5256 -2.5490* 0.8306 -3.7279* 1.8345 
Baseline, week29-34 -3.0870* 0.8709 -1.6065 1.5273 -2.3934* 0.8306 -3.5133 1.8343 
Baseline, week35-40 -3.3450* 0.8732 -1.5534 1.5290 -2.5830* 0.8326 -3.7076* 1.8387 
Baseline, week41-46 -2.3427* 0.8700 -0.0213 1.5204 -1.5696 0.8294 -2.0311 1.8277 
Baseline, week47-52 -3.0462* 0.8756 -0.8992 1.5299 -2.2730* 0.8348 -2.9635 1.8390 
Baseline, week53-S8 -3.1110* 0.8778 -1.1229 1.5360 -2.3400* 0.8369 -3.2425 1.8476 
Baseline, week59-64 -3.2949* 0.8826 -0.8814 1.5345 -2.4901* 0.8410 -2.9525 1.8446 
Baseline, week65-71 -2.8986* 0.9587 -13.6639 417.5207 -2.2205* 0.9222 -15.8255 510.9135 
Ever had a full-time job 0.1526 0.1513 -0.1973 0.2297 0.0834 0.1397 -0.0686 0.2908 
Profes. /Interm. Occ. 0.1691 0.0966 0.3462* 0.1661 0.2054* 0.0920 0.2091 0.2003 
Unskilled Occupation -0.4018* 0.1699 -0.2228 0.2794 -0.3961* 0.1634 -0.2202 0.3159 
Logarithm of Ag e -1.3355* 0.1387 -0.1602 0.2320 -1.2396* 0.1316 -0.0252 0.2790 
Female Person -0.2102 0.2076 0.1966 0.2357 0.0388 0.1777 0.0431 0.2853 
Male and Married person 0.3035* 0.1151 -0.1932 0.1751 0.2795* 0.1094 -0.2524 0.2014 
Has any child aged < 5 -O.2942* 0.0830 -0.2370 0.1692 -0.2693* 0.0804 -0.2814 0.1988 
Has any child aged < 11 -0.0137 0.0818 0.0799 0.1642 -0.0355 0.0798 0.2547 0.1838 
Searches less than bef ore -0.8903* 0.1627 -0.0620 0.1699 -0.9220* 0.1540 0.2253 0.1865 
Values Leisure more -0.2842* 0.1112 0.1343 0.1524 -0.2399* O.IO4O 0.1429 0.1777 
Experience money shortage 0.1285 0.0663 -0.1716 0.1240 0.1125 0.0637 -0.2050 0.1478 
House owner 0.3651* 0.0711 0.2187 0.1285 0.3754* 0.0682 0.1425 0.1506 
County unemployment rate -0.0241* 0.0103 -0.0128 0.0180 -O.O244* 0.0098 -0.0050 0.0211 
Receives only UB at lst int. 0.7748* 0.0779 1.0226* 0.1434 0.7761* 0.0747 1.0397* 0.1686 
UB/SB level £logs. -0.0714 0.0391 -0.2996* 0.0530 -0.1203* 0.0353 -0.2302* 0.0661 
Expected earn. £logs. 0.8050* 0.1989 -0.5464 0.3456 0.6331* 0.1897 -0.3468 0.4132 
Exp. earn. not available 3.6196* 0.9450 -2.0108 1.6204 2.9080* 0.8992 -1.2136 I.9439 
Competing risk (1) max. log-l ik. -6729.2 ; Competi ng risk (2) mar. log-lik -6637.7 . Descriptiv ; siatistics •>f the 
explanatory variables are proi lided in Ta Ue 0.3 in the data s iction. A * indicaies s tatistical si gnificance c ü the 
two-sided 5% level. 
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The results of estimation of the two models (1) and (2) (shown in Ta-
ble 0.6) suggest that the gender of the unemployed person does not affect 
significantly the individual chances of leaving unemployment. Marital sta-
tus is instead found to infiuence significantly the individual re-employment 
probability. Married men are found to be 35% more likely to leave unem-
ployment to take up a job (either full-time or part-time) than single people 
of either gender. Single people of either gender are, instead, found to stand 
equal chances of leaving unemployment, other things staying equal. 
5. Conclusions 
The analysis carried out in this paper leads to the conclusion that the job 
search behaviour of single women does not differ significantly from that of 
single men. I find, instead, that the job search behaviour of single people of 
either gender differ significantly from that of married men. Married men are 
found to have significantly higher re-employment probabilities than single 
people of either gender. 
Future work should be aimed at gathering evidence on the probability of 
leaving unemployment of married women. The duration of unemployment of 
married women should be compared with that of married men and of single 
people of either gender. 
Vrije Universiteit and Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam 
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